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103 
The First Amendment and the Politics of  
Reproductive Health Care 
B. Jessie Hill 
More than forty years after Roe v. Wade
1
 and more than fifty years 
after Griswold v. Connecticut,
2
 nearly every aspect of reproductive 
rights remains intensely disputed. The courts continue to struggle 
with the scope of the constitutional right to abortion.
3
 Employers seek 
exemptions from generally applicable requirements to provide 
insurance coverage for contraception, re-opening questions about 
women’s need for contraception that once seemed well settled.4 
Indeed, the very nature of abortion and contraception is contested: 
some consider them to be essential health care, whereas others 
consider them controversial moral choices. Moreover, these two 
different ways of looking at reproductive health care operate not only 
in the social political realms but also often, in unacknowledged ways, 
in the judicial realm. 
This Article examines these hidden assumptions about the place of 
reproductive health care—especially contraception and abortion—
within health care more generally. Abortion and contraception are 
often perceived by courts and legislators as being something other 
than health care. Moreover, reproductive health is doctrinally, and 
 
 
 Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to Liz Sepper for inviting me to contribute 
to this symposium.  
 1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 2. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 3. As of this writing, the Supreme Court is preparing to revisit the meaning of the “undue 
burden” standard for abortion restrictions in Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th 
Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt __ S. Ct. __, 2015 
WL 517636 (Nov. 13, 2015).  
 4. This Term, the Supreme Court will revisit the scope of the right of employees of 
religious organizations to access subsidized contraception in Geneva College v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Hum. Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015), and the related cases that were 
consolidated with it. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 144 (Nov. 6, 2015). 
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often even physically or geographically, isolated from health care 
more generally—for example, abortions generally take place in 
freestanding clinics rather than hospitals or doctors’ offices.5 
Arguably, this isolation has encouraged, if not enabled, differential 
regulation of reproductive health care,
6
 for example in the form of so-
called TRAP (Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers) laws.
7
 
These include laws that require clinics offering abortions to meet 
certain standards—such as having physicians on staff who hold 
admitting privileges at a local hospital—that are not applicable to 
other medical procedures of similar risk level.
8
 
If reproductive health care is not exactly health care, then what is 
it? In the views of some courts and commentators, abortion and 
contraception are not forms health care, but instead political, moral, 
or ideological choices. Of course, suggesting that abortion and 
contraception possess moral dimensions will not strike most people 
as outrageous or surprising. Indeed, many health care decisions have 
moral and political dimensions. But in many cases, the moral 
dimension of reproductive health care leads courts to construct it as 
primarily, or even exclusively, a moral (or political or ideological) 
choice and to obscure the private, medical dimensions altogether. 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) could counteract this view 
somewhat. For the first time, contraception was identified as an 
“essential health benefit.”9 Indeed, it is significant that the ACA 
 
 5. See David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical 
Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 833, 837–40 (1999) (describing how most abortions came to be 
provided in free-standing clinics). 
 6. Id. at 839 (arguing that, by “concentrat[ing] abortion services in the free-standing 
clinics and in the hands of what quickly became a very small number of abortion providers,” 
pro-choice groups were telling “organized medicine, which had become an important 
participant in abortion liberalization efforts, [that it] no longer had to hold itself responsible for 
helping to provide actual abortion services”). 
 7. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Science Disputes in Abortion Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
1849, 1849–50 (2015) (defining “TRAP” laws). 
 8. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) (adjudicating 
a constitutional challenge to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031 (West. Supp. 
2014), which requires that abortion providers, but not other physicians, possess hospital 
admitting privileges); Ushma Upadhyay et al., Incidence of Emergency Department Visits and 
Complications After Abortion, 125 OBSTET. GYNECOL. 175 (2015) (finding that the 
complication rate for abortion is extremely low). 
 9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022 (West 2014); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (2012). Although the 
ACA requires provision of essential health benefits, and essential health benefits must include 
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affirms that contraception is not just health care, but it is actually 
essential health care. It is thus possible to see the Affordable Care 
Act’s contraceptive coverage mandate as an initial attempt to break 
down the distinction between reproductive health care and the rest of 
health care. Put another way, the ACA may be breaking down the 
distinction between “therapeutic” health care—that which is designed 
to meet important medical needs—and “elective” health care such as 
contraception and abortion, which may be seen as the product of a 
moral choice. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. First, Part I 
demonstrates how reproductive health care has been treated as 
second-class health care. In large part, the view of abortion and 
contraception as less-than-essential health care has been created and 
reinforced by the longstanding distinction between “elective” and 
“therapeutic” reproductive health care services. Part II then turns to 
the First Amendment. Drawing on recent controversies at the 
intersection of reproductive rights and First Amendment rights, this 
Part analyzes how the tendency to view reproductive health care as 
something other than “real” or “essential” health care has played out 
when courts are tasked with categorizing reproductive health-related 
speech for First Amendment purposes. Specifically, it demonstrates 
the schism that arises in the case law between judges that view 
reproductive health care as primarily medical and those that view it 
as something else—an elective procedure and thus a moral, political, 
or ideological choice. Finally, this Article concludes in Part III with 
an attempt to sketch a defense of the view that reproductive health 
care is essential, necessary, and therapeutic rather than merely the 
elective product of a moral choice.  
I. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE: “THERAPEUTIC” OR “ELECTIVE”? 
The distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic abortion 
and contraception has permeated case law and popular discourse for 
 
preventive services for women, the statute itself does not specify that contraception constitutes 
such a service. Instead, that requirement is found in the implementing regulations. See 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (referencing guidelines promulgated by Health Resources and 
Services Administration, available at http://hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/).  
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decades. The distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic 
health care is thus important not only for its direct legal effect—that 
is, because some legal rules draw distinctions between therapeutic 
and elective interventions—but also because it shapes the way 
politicians, individuals, and voters think about reproductive health 
care, often on an unconscious level. This Part thus presents a handful 
of examples of how the therapeutic/elective distinction has been 
identified and remains entrenched in American legal and political 
discourse. 
The Hyde Amendment, passed for the first time in 1976 and again 
every year thereafter, is an appropriations rider that forbids the use of 
federal Medicaid funds to pay for abortions except in certain narrow 
circumstances.
10
 The scope of the restriction on federal funds has 
varied over time—sometimes permitting federal payment for 
abortions only to save the life of the woman or if the pregnancy 
resulted from rape or incest, and at other points including the “health” 
of the woman as a permissible indication—but the focus on funding 
only “therapeutic” abortions remained throughout.11 Indeed, the terms 
“therapeutic” and “elective” permeate the debates over the Hyde 
Amendment, particularly in its early years.
12
 More recently enacted 
state statutes, as well, draw distinctions between therapeutic and non-
therapeutic abortion, often defining “therapeutic” quite narrowly.13 
 
 10. Pub. L. No. 94–439, § 209, 90 Stat 1418 (1976) (first Hyde Amendment, enacted 
September 30, 1976); see generally Jon F. Merz et al., A Review of Abortion Policy: Legality, 
Medicaid Funding, and Parental Involvement, 1967–1994, 17 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 1, 7–8 & 
n.44 (1995). In addition, the ACA and an executive order issued by President Barack Obama 
now reinforce the restrictions contained in the Hyde Amendment. Exec. Order No. 13,535 § 1, 
75 Fed. Reg. 15,599 (Mar. 29, 2010); 42 U.S.C.A. § 18023(b)(1)(B) (West 2010).  
 11. Merz, supra note 10, at n.44.  
 12. See, e.g., 122 Cong. Rec. 34828, 34829 (1976) (contrasting therapeutic and elective 
abortions for funding purposes). 
 13. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3,106 (West 2010) (forbidding abortions after 
twenty weeks unless the woman “has a condition which so complicates her medical condition 
as to necessitate the abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or to avert serious risk of 
substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function”); Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 9.04 (West 2011) (defining nontherapeutic abortion as “an abortion that is performed or 
induced when the life of the mother would not be endangered if the fetus were carried to term 
or when the pregnancy of the mother was not the result of rape or incest reported to a law 
enforcement agency”). 
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Tracing the distinction back yet further, Professor Melissa Murray 
has written about the history of birth control litigation.
14
 Before 
Griswold v. Connecticut, Murray notes, there were two federal 
challenges to Connecticut’s criminal ban on contraceptives that made 
it to the U.S. Supreme Court.
15
 One was the well-known case of Poe 
v. Ullman, in which the Supreme Court dismissed the challenge to the 
Connecticut birth control ban because of its supposed history of non-
enforcement.
16
 The other was Trubek v. Ullman, which the Supreme 
Court dismissed without opinion on the same day as Poe, likely for 
the same reason.
17
 As Murray points out, Poe involved two 
traditional married couples, with breadwinner husbands and stay-at-
home wives, both of whom needed to avoid pregnancy because of 
serious potential health consequences for the wife.
18
 Trubek, by 
contrast, involved a less traditional couple, both law students, who 
wished to use contraception solely for family planning purposes.
19
 
Thus, it appears that the two cases revolved around two dichotomies: 
traditional versus egalitarian gender roles within marriage (gender 
equality), and therapeutic versus non-therapeutic uses of 
contraception (health).
20
 Poe involved contraception that was 
medically necessary in a narrow sense, whereas Trubek involved 
contraception that was necessary only for family and career planning 
purposes. The fact that the litigation strategy proceeded on these two 
 
 14. Melissa Murray, Overlooking Equality on the Road to Griswold, 124 YALE L.J. 
FORUM 324 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/overlooking-equality-on-the-road-to-
griswold. 
 15. Id. at 324. 
 16. 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961) (“The fact that Connecticut has not chosen to press the 
enforcement of this statute deprives these controversies of the immediacy which is an 
indispensable condition of constitutional adjudication. This Court cannot be umpire to debates 
concerning harmless, empty shadows.”). 
 17. 367 U.S. 907 (1961). Three of the dissenters in Poe also dissented from the dismissal 
of the appeal in Trubek because they were “of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be 
noted.” Id. 
 18. Murray, supra note 14, at 325. 
 19. Id. (citing Louise G. Trubek, Op-Ed, The Unfinished Fight over Contraception, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/opinion/contraception-war-goes-
on.html).  
 20. Murray focuses on the fact that the Trubek case had the potential to bring the issue 
gender equality before the Court, but that issue was ultimately submerged in the Griswold 
litigation, in which the Court recognized a right to access contraception while invoking 
traditional concepts of marriage and marital privacy. Murray, supra note 14, at 327–29. 
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parallel paths suggests, then, that the therapeutic/non-therapeutic 
distinction was present from the very beginnings of the judicial 
recognition of constitutional reproductive rights. 
Professor Mary Dudziak has also examined the history of early 
birth control litigation in Connecticut, noting that, despite pleas from 
litigants, the Connecticut Supreme Court declined to read an 
exception into the state prohibition allowing contraception when the 
woman’s life would be at risk from a pregnancy.21 The solution in 
this situation, according to the court, was for the married couple in 
question simply to refrain from sex.
22
 Thus, in suggesting that 
pregnancy itself was always elective, in a sense, the Connecticut 
court firmly placed reproductive health care outside of the framework 
of necessary or therapeutic health care.
23
 
The distinction plays out in contemporary political discourse as 
well. In particular, the claims for religious and conscientious 
exemptions from providing certain health care services—culminating 
in the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
24
 litigation—tend to downplay the 
significance of contraceptives to women’s health. Indeed, Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent in that case took the majority to task for failing to 
recognize the importance of contraceptives in the context of women’s 
health care and for ignoring the harms to women arising from 
religious exemptions.
25
  
In fact, some religious doctrines distinguish between 
contraceptives used for therapeutic and contraceptive purposes.
26
 An 
 
 21. Mary L. Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the Connecticut Supreme Court 
Before Griswold v. Connecticut, 75 IOWA L. REV. 915, 925 (1990) (discussing Tileston v. 
Ullman, 26 A.2d 582 (Conn. 1942), and State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856 (Conn. 1940)). 
 22. Id. at 925–26. 
 23. Id. Ironically, as Dudziak notes, Connecticut’s abortion law did allow for abortions to 
save the life of the woman, thus making its abortion law more liberal than its contraceptives 
law. Id. at 926. 
 24. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 25. Id. at 2788–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining the significance of contraceptive 
coverage to women’s health and economic and social equality and noting that the religious 
exemption “would deny legions of women who do not hold their employers’ beliefs access to 
contraceptive coverage that the ACA would otherwise secure.”). 
 26. Leonard J. Nelson, III, God and Woman in the Catholic Hospital, 31 J. LEGIS. 69, 
103–04 (2004) (discussing the Catholic principle of “double effect”). The doctrine of double 
effect refers to the Catholic belief that certain forbidden actions, such as abortion or euthanasia, 
may be considered morally licit if they are done with the intention of achieving a permissible 
goal. For example, Leonard J. Nelson, III gives the example of a surgical sterilization, which is 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/5
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Arizona law passed in 2012 (before Hobby Lobby) appeared to 
embrace that distinction, allowing religious employers to refuse to 
provide coverage for prescription contraception if it violated their 
beliefs to do so, except if the drug was required for “medical 
indications other than for contraceptive, abortifacient, abortion or 
sterilization purposes.”27 Indeed, this distinction has permeated even 
medical discourse to some extent. For example, Professor Farr 
Curlin, who has written extensively (and supportively) about 
conscientious objections to the provision of health care, refers to 
reproductive health care services as “controversial clinical practices,” 
and “legal yet controversial treatments,” seemingly distinguishing 
them from other types of medical procedures and studiously avoiding 
any implication of therapeutic benefit.
28
 Similarly, in an online article 
for an ethics journal, Professor Curlin and his co-author Rev. Russell 
Burck discuss a hypothetical example of a physician who is asked by 
his young, unmarried, adult female patient to prescribe contraception. 
The doctor’s choice whether to prescribe the drugs, according to 
Curlin, “is a moral choice which implicitly or explicitly expresses a 
moral judgment.”29  
To summarize, the distinction between health care that is 
“therapeutic” and reproductive health care—which is not—has 
 
illict if performed to prevent future pregnancies but permissible if sterilization occurs in the 
course of removing a diseased organ to cure the sterilized individual. Id. (citing CHARLES J. 
MCFADDEN, MEDICAL ETHICS 294–95 (3d ed. 1953)); see also CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH 2271–74 (1994) (distinguishing between “direct abortion, that is to say, abortion 
willed either as an end or a means” and actions such as prenatal diagnosis that are taken without 
the intention of ending fetal or embryonic life but that may result in accidental termination of a 
pregnancy); cf. id. at 2279 (stating, with respect to euthanasia, that “[t]he use of painkillers to 
alleviate the sufferings of the dying, even at the risk of shortening their days, can be morally in 
conformity with human dignity if death is not willed as either an end or a means, but only 
foreseen and tolerated as inevitable”). 
 27. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-826(Z) (2014) (West). 
 28. Farr A. Curlin, M.D., et al., Religion, Conscience, and Controversial Clinical 
Practices, 356 N. ENG. J. MED. 593, 593, 595, 597 (2007). 
 29. Farr A. Curlin, M.D. & Rev. Russell Burck, Ph.D., Clinical Case: Patient Counseling 
and Matters of Conscience, VIRTUAL MENTOR: ETHICS JAMA 3 (May 2005) (Commentary 1 
by Prof. Curlin), available at http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2005/05/pdf/ccas3-0505.pdf. 
Later in the article, Curlin minimizes the focus on reproductive health services as uniquely 
controversial, stating that “the pretense of neutrality cannot be sustained in any case where a 
physician is asked to make a judgment, and such judgments are implicit in all deliberate human 
actions, such as the decision to prescribe contraceptives, or, for that matter, to prescribe anti-
hypertensives.” Id.  
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permeated legal, political, and even to some degree medical discourse 
since the use and legalization of contraception and abortion became 
widespread. While this Article does not argue that the distinction has 
always been firmly maintained in all contexts, it has been remarkably 
salient and persistent. The next Part considers some of the 
implications of this distinction for First Amendment issues that arise 
in the reproductive health care context. 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS 
I have argued elsewhere that, in recent First Amendment cases 
arising in the reproductive health care context, many courts have 
tended to view abortion and contraception (albeit not explicitly) as 
something other than health care—primarily, as a moral or 
ideological choice.
30
 This submerged understanding of reproductive 
health care as “not really health care,” I argue, has often driven the 
First Amendment analysis in ways that have gone largely unnoticed. 
This Part summarizes and extends that argument. 
In a series of recent cases, courts have considered the extent to 
which the government can require entities known as Crisis Pregnancy 
Centers (CPCs) to disclose the limited nature of their services and to 
convey certain health-related messages.
31
 CPCs are generally non-
profit organizations that are often set up to look like medical clinics, 
whose primary goal is to dissuade pregnant women from choosing 
abortion.
32
 These entities may be religiously affiliated and may have 
no licensed medical practitioners on-site, despite offering 
ultrasounds, pregnancy testing, and counseling, along with some 
forms of material and emotional support to pregnant women.
33
  
 
 30. B. Jessie Hill, Casey Meets the Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 59 
(2015). 
 31. Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013); Greater Balt. 
Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns v. Mayor of Balt., 721 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2013); O’Brien v. Mayor 
of Balt., 768 F. Supp. 2d 804 (D. Md. 2011), vacated in part on other grounds in Greater Balt. 
Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 721 F.3d 264; Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 
F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014); A Woman's Friend Pregnancy Res. 
Clinic v. Harris, No. 2:15-CV-02122-KJM-AC, 2015 WL 9274116 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2015). 
 32. Alice X. Chen, Crisis Pregnancy Centers: Impeding the Right to Informed Decision 
Making, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 933, 936–37 (2013). 
 33. Id. at 936; New York, N.Y., Local Law 17 § 1 (Mar. 16, 2011) (findings) (stating that 
CPCs in New York City have been found to deceive clients about “the availability of licensed 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/5
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Responding to documented incidents of deceptive conduct by 
CPCs that sought to trick women into believing they were medical 
establishments or abortion clinics (and in some instances trying to 
prevent women from accessing abortion altogether) some 
municipalities instituted disclosure requirements.
34
 In particular, 
these municipalities required CPCs to make it known to clients that 
they do not have a licensed medical professional on staff; that they do 
not provide or refer for contraception or abortion; and/or that 
government recommends that pregnant women see a licensed health 
professional.
35
 Courts have generally applied heightened scrutiny to 
these compelled speech requirements under the First Amendment, on 
the theory that they require mention of “controversial services” and 
are therefore “ideological.”36 Indeed, the Second Circuit in Evergreen 
Ass’n v. City of New York suggested that abortion and contraception 
were a matter of “public concern” and that the recommendation that 
pregnant women should see licensed medical professionals is a 
“public issue subject to dispute.”37  
The framing of reproductive health care as a moral or ideological 
choice and a matter of public concern rather than as private health 
care is significant not just because it may shape the social meaning 
and public understanding of contraception and abortion, but also 
because this framing arguably affects the outcome in First 
Amendment disputes. Particularly in the CPC cases, the non-profit 
entities challenged the municipalities’ restrictions as compelled 
ideological speech. In accepting the CPCs’ framing of the required 
disclosures regarding the availability of certain services and medical 
personnel as “ideological” in the reproductive health care context, 
courts placed the case in a category that required heightened scrutiny 
 
medical providers that provide or oversee services on-site”). 
 34. New York, N.Y., Local Law 17 § 1; Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 779 F. Supp. 2d 
456, 459 (D. Md. 2011) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 683 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2012), aff’d on reh’g 
en banc sub nom. Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing 
Montgomery County Res. No. 16–1252 (Feb. 2, 2010)). 
 35. See Evergreen Ass’n, 740 F.3d 233; Centro Tepeyac, 722 F.3d 184; Greater Balt. 
Ctr., 721 F.3d 264. 
 36. See infra note 38. 
 37. Evergreen Ass’n, 740 F.3d at 250 (“It may be the case that most, if not all, pregnancy 
services centers would agree that pregnant women should see a doctor. That decision, however, 
as this litigation demonstrates, is a public issue subject to dispute.”). 
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according to First Amendment doctrine.
38
 If the required disclosures 
had been viewed as dealing with primarily medical issues, the speech 
likely would have been understood to constitute professional speech, 
which receives a very low level of scrutiny (much like standard 
medical informed consent requirements).
39
 Indeed, the required 
disclosures could be seen as speech that is essentially aimed at 
regulating a form of conduct that could constitute unlicensed practice 
of medicine, since CPCs sometimes intentionally adopt the 
appearance of medical clinics and offer diagnostic and related 
medical services.
40
  
By contrast, in cases dealing with ideologically-charged informed 
consent requirements for abortion, courts’ framing of abortion as a 
moral or ideological choice rather than as health care leads them to 
uphold these forced disclosures under the First Amendment. This 
seemingly counter-intuitive result arises from the fact that the 
framing of abortion as a moral or ideological choice leads courts to 
 
 38. Evergreen Ass’n, 740 F.3d at 245 (holding that the challenged speech is subject to 
either strict or intermediate scrutiny); Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 779 F. Supp. 2d 
456, 468 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 683 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2012), aff’d on reh’g 
en banc, 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013). Sitting en banc, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district 
court’s application of strict scrutiny in Centro Tepeyac but emphasized that the district court 
agreed the speech was non-commercial and non-professional because “it could not determine 
otherwise on the undeveloped record before it.” Centro Tepeyac, 722 F.3d at 189 (emphasis 
added). But see A Woman's Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, No. 2:15-CV-02122-KJM-
AC, 2015 WL 9274116, at *19-23 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2015) (holding that CPC speech should 
be categorized as professional speech and therefore that CPC disclosure requirements are 
subject either to intermediate scrutiny or to a “reasonableness” test). 
 39. See generally Hill, supra note 30, at 60–62 (explaining that the Supreme Court has not 
directly addressed the category of professional speech in its First Amendment jurisprudence but 
that rational basis review is generally applied to speech restrictions in the professional-speech 
context); see also A Woman's Friend, 2015 WL 9274116, at *19-23 (applying a lower level of 
scrutiny to a law requiring certain disclosures for CPCs after identifying CPC speech as 
professional speech and identifying the relevant government interest as “ensur[ing] that 
California residents know their rights and the health care resources available to them when they 
make their personal reproductive health care decisions”) (emphasis added). 
 40. Jennifer Keighley offers the analogy of a “Sickle Cell Anemia Treatments Options 
Center” that looks like a clinic but does not employ licensed medical professionals and counsels 
against blood transfusions (based on religious belief). Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle 
the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
539, 604 (2012); see generally Kirsten Gallacher, Protecting Women from Deception: The 
Constitutionality of Disclosure Requirements in Pregnancy Centers, 33 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 
113, 125 (2011) (“Some pregnancy centers . . . locate near abortion or medical clinics and try to 
look like them.”). 
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view a wider range of propositions—not just medical facts, but also 
metaphysical or ideological statements—as relevant to the abortion 
decision. For example, the State of South Dakota requires physicians 
to inform women seeking abortions that they are about to terminate 
the life of “a whole, separate, unique, living human being.”41 In 
Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, the Eighth Circuit considered 
whether that required disclosure violated physicians’ First 
Amendment rights.
42
  To answer that question, the court looked to 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which briefly stated that informed 
consent requirements are constitutionally acceptable if they are 
relevant, truthful, and non-misleading.
43
 Because it framed abortion 
as moral rather than medical, the Eighth Circuit upheld the 
disclosures in Rounds, finding that informed consent requirements 
that extend beyond an explanation of the “medical risks” of the 
procedure were nonetheless “relevant,” because “abortion requires a 
difficult and painful moral decision.”44 In this way, the court 
suggested that abortion is different from other medical procedures, in 
which the informed consent process is limited to medical risks, 
benefits, and alternatives.
45
 
Thus, in cases like Rounds, courts rely on the medical aspects of 
abortion to frame abortion informed-consent requirements as 
compelled professional speech, which, according to Casey, is subject 
to a much lower level of scrutiny than compelled ideological speech. 
But then, by also framing abortion as predominantly (or at least 
substantially) a moral decision rather than a medical one, courts 
expand the concept of “relevance” beyond its traditional boundaries 
in the informed-consent context. In this way, government-mandated 
statements about the transcendental nature of the fetus or embryo can 
be justified as relevant to the medical decision. 
 
 41. Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2008)). 
 42. Id. at 724. 
 43. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (plurality op.). 
 44. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007)) 
(emphasis added). 
 45. See Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light, Less 
Heat, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 31–32 (2011). 
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Unfortunately, this manipulation of the notion of relevance 
conflicts with the justifications for subjecting compelled professional 
speech like informed consent to a lower standard of scrutiny. In 
particular, the idea that the government should have some leeway to 
require disclosures in the informed-consent context derives in large 
part from the notion that professionals such as physicians have 
superior knowledge and therefore superior power over the patient that 
requires special protection of the patient.
46
 Once the informed-
consent requirements no longer relate to medical issues within the 
physician’s domain of expertise, however, this patient-protection 
rationale fades away.
47
 
Interestingly, some of the earliest cases extending First 
Amendment protection to commercial speech also dealt with 
reproductive health care. In those cases, too, the understanding of 
reproductive health care as not being primarily medical influenced 
the doctrinal framework that was applied to the free-speech claims. 
For example, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., the Supreme 
Court considered the constitutionality of a ban on mailing unsolicited 
advertisements for condoms.
48
 Although some of the brochures 
contained factual discussions of sexually transmitted infections, 
others were simply advertisements.
49
 Treating all of these items the 
same for First Amendment purposes, the Court noted that the flyers 
“contain[ed] discussions of important public issues” and struck down 
the ban.
50
 Thus, the framing of reproductive health care as having a 
non-medical, political dimension arguably contributed to the 
protection of speech about reproductive health care. A similar 
analysis affected the Court’s approach in another early case, Bigelow 
v. Virginia, in which the Court found that an advertisement for 
 
 46. See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 229–32 (1985); see generally Daniel 
Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social 
Institutions, 47 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999). 
 47. Sawicki, supra note 45, at 32. 
 48. 463 U.S. 60, 60 (1983). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 67. 
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abortion services was protected commercial speech.
51
 In so holding, 
the Court noted that the advertisement discussed issues of “clear 
‘public interest,’” such as the legal status of abortion in New York, 
which was “not unnewsworthy.”52 By contrast, the Virginia Supreme 
Court had upheld the newspaper’s conviction for violating Virginia’s 
law against advertising abortion services, on the ground that the law 
pertained to medical care and was clearly within the state’s police 
power to pass.
53
 Placing abortion in a broader political context 
allowed the Supreme Court to afford expansive protection to the 
advertisement, whereas pure commercial speech would likely have 
received a lower level of protection. 
In a different area of the First Amendment—abortion protests—
the framing of reproductive health care could also be seen as 
affecting the approach to the free-speech questions. In the recent case 
of McCullen v. Coakley, Justice Scalia sparred with counsel over 
whether to refer to picketers outside an abortion clinic as “protestors” 
or “counselors.”54 Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the 
 
 51. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The advertisement, which was published in 1971, stated:  
UNWANTED PREGNANCY 
LET US HELP YOU 
Abortions are now legal in New York. 
There are no residency requirements. 
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN ACCREDITED 
HOSPITALS AND CLINICS AT LOW COST 
Contact 
WOMEN’S PAVILION 
515 Madison Avenue 
New York, N.Y. 10022 
or call any time 
(212) 371-6670 or (212) 371-6650 
AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK 
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. We will make 
all arrangements for you and help you 
with information and counseling. 
Id. at 812. 
 52. Id. at 823. 
 53. Bigelow v. Comm’r, 191 S.E.2d 173, 176 (Va. 1972), rev’d, 413 U.S. 909 (1973). 
 54. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, 43, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) 
(No. 12-1168) (“I — I object to you calling these people protestors, which you’ve been doing 
here during the whole presentation. That is not how they present themselves. They do not say 
they want to make protests. They say they want to talk quietly to the women who are going into 
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majority insisted that the picketers were engaged in “counseling” and 
were “not protestors.”55 By rejecting the “protestor” label in favor of 
the “counseling” label, the majority analogized the activity to what 
takes place in an intimate (mental or physical) health-care setting.
56
 
This framing of the picketers’ activity is part of what led the Court to 
see the buffer zone surrounding the clinic as overbroad and 
insufficiently tailored, since it was aimed at limiting loud, intrusive 
protests.
57
 At the same time, however, the notion that women ought 
to be open to “counseling” and quiet suggestion from complete 
strangers on the street is somewhat incongruous with an 
understanding of the abortion decision as private. Perhaps Justices 
Scalia and Roberts could see this notion as unexceptional only 
because they understood the woman’s abortion decision as somehow 
of interest and relevance to other people, or to the public at large—
not, in other words, as fundamentally private. 
Finally, though it is not a First Amendment case, the majority’s 
opinion Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, dealing with protection of religious 
freedom under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 
arguably minimizes the therapeutic aspects of contraception in 
foregrounding the individual claims of conscience.
58
 In the majority’s 
consideration of whether the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive 
coverage mandate violates the rights of certain religious employers, 
the health dimension of contraception is almost entirely lost. Indeed, 
by simply “assuming” the Government’s interest “in guaranteeing 
cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods,”59 
without even mentioning the word “health,” the majority minimized 
 
these facilities. Now how does that make them protestors?”); Id. at 24 (referring to “abortion 
counselors”). 
 55. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2527, 2536 (2014). 
 56. Id. at 2536 (“Petitioners are not protestors. They seek not merely to express their 
opposition to abortion, but to inform women of various alternatives and to provide help in 
pursuing them. Petitioners believe that they can accomplish this objective only through 
personal, caring, consensual conversations.”).  
 57. Id. at 2535–37. 
 58. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 59. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780; cf. Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Compelling 
Interests and Contraception, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1025, 1031 (2015) (noting the ways in which 
the majority’s opinion and the Government’s brief were both “incomplete” in their descriptions 
of the interests at stake in Hobby Lobby). 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016]  The First Amendment and Reproductive Health Care 117 
 
 
the public-health and individual health benefits of contraceptives 
coverage; the women affected by the decision are nearly invisible. 
60
 
Ultimately, the characterization of reproductive health care as 
something other than health care can cut either way. It can lead to 
greater protection for reproductive-health related speech; it can also 
protect speech intended to mislead women who may wish to seek an 
abortion. Either way, unacknowledged assumptions about the place 
of reproductive health care within health care more generally often 
drives the doctrinal First Amendment analysis. 
III. IS ALL REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE “THERAPEUTIC”? 
This Article concludes with some reflections on whether 
reproductive health care—particularly abortion and contraception—
can and should be understood as “essential” or “therapeutic” health 
care. Feminists and reproductive rights advocates have long rejected 
the notion that there is such a thing as “non-therapeutic” reproductive 
health care,
61
 but this idea has not been sufficiently developed in the 
legal literature. Indeed, even within this distinction, the definition of 
“therapeutic” has been remarkably fuzzy.62  
In the vast majority of cases, contraception and abortion are used 
for purposes of “family planning,” rather than to avoid physical 
ailments or injury.
63
 But the concept of family planning—itself rather 
 
 60. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, by contrast, partially supplied this missing rationale. 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2788–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that, with the 
contraceptive coverage requirement, “Congress left health care decisions—including the choice 
among contraceptive methods—in the hands of women, with the aid of their health care 
providers”). 
 61. See, e.g., Susan Randall, Health Care Reform and Abortion, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN’S 
L.J. 58, 76 n.46 (1994); Suzanna Sherry, Women’s Virtue, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1591, 1598 n.6 
(1989); cf. Lance Gable, Reproductive Health as a Human Right, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 957, 
982 (2010) (describing the “right to health” model for protecting reproductive health rights 
under international law). 
 62. See, e.g., B. Jessie Hill, What Is the Meaning of Health? Constitutional Implications 
of Defining “Medical Necessity” and “Essential Health Benefits” Under the Affordable Care 
Act, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 445, 459 (2012) (discussing the Hyde Amendment debates); Sherry, 
supra note 61, at 1598 n.6 (discussing the incoherence of considering abortions for pregnancies 
resulting from rape or incest to be “therapeutic” while not taking seriously the mental health 
costs of carrying other unwanted pregnancies to term). 
 63. Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and 
Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 110 (2005). 
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amorphous—does not fit obviously or easily into most 
understandings of health care or medical treatments, which often 
center on avoidance or treatment of disease.
64
 Indeed, pregnancy, 
which seems eminently “natural,” can be a healthy, wanted state. It is 
unlike many other physical conditions in that the identical condition 
may be perfectly desirable and thus “healthy” or, in a sense, 
pathological, depending on the subjective desires of the individual 
woman. 
At same time, it seems relevant that pregnancy itself is a state for 
which medical attention is generally sought (the Second Circuit’s 
skepticism about that proposition in Evergreen notwithstanding).
65
 
Moreover, even in common usage “therapeutic” treatments are not 
just those that heal the patient or rid her of “disease.” They also 
include those that rid the individual of unwanted, undesirable health 
conditions and health risks, as well as negative social and emotional 
effects.
66
 Medical treatments to correct a disfiguring deformity, such 
as breast implants after a mastectomy, are one example of therapeutic 
and widely accepted health care that corrects primarily for negative 
social and emotional effects. According to this wider understanding 
of necessary health care, unwanted pregnancy is not just a social 
emergency for the individual—it is an undesirable medical state. 
Indeed, pregnancy certainly includes physical risks and sometimes 
illness, at least temporarily, and it is a physical state that can reduce 
normal functioning in some respects. As one court has put it, 
avoiding unwanted pregnancy allows woman to “prevent a litany of 
physical, emotional, economic, and social consequences.”67 
Unintended pregnancies and births are associated with a wide range 
 
 64. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, Unhealthy Determinations: Controlling “Medical 
Necessity”, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 435, 440 (2015) (citing, among other things, the 
American Medical Association description of “a ‘prudent’ physician’s provision of medical 
care [as being] aimed at ‘preventing, diagnosing[,] or treating an illness, injury, disease or its 
symptoms.’”). 
 65. Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 250 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 435 (2014). 
 66. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 
1468 (1994) (discussing Professor Norman Daniels’s theory that necessary health care is health 
care aimed at providing a “normal opportunity range” to individuals). 
 67. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1273 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
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of physical and mental health problems for the mother and the 
child.
68
 
Nonetheless, it remains difficult for many people to recognize that 
an abortion of an unwanted pregnancy that occurs simply because the 
pregnancy is unplanned constitutes a “therapeutic” abortion. Indeed, 
emphasizing the physical and mental health risks of pregnancy may 
operate to rhetorically re-inscribe the distinction between the 
therapeutic and the non-therapeutic. The narrowly medical account of 
the risks of unintended pregnancy feels incomplete and not quite 
right; something more is needed to demonstrate that all reproductive 
health care wanted and needed by a woman is, in fact, necessary 
health care.  
That “something more” may be the equality framework for 
reproductive rights. The notion that the need to avoid or end a 
pregnancy for career and family planning reasons makes it just as 
therapeutic as avoiding it for more narrowly physical, medical 
reasons only makes sense in light of a perspective that recognizes 
equality of opportunity and autonomy over one’s life path as an 
aspect of full human flourishing. It is only by rejecting pregnancy as 
natural, as part of the inevitable duty and destiny of all women, and 
therefore in all circumstances a positive good (or at least by refusing 
to see forced childbearing as a relatively minor harm, as being not as 
bad as going through life with a deformity, for example), that we can 
see how avoiding or ending unwanted pregnancy is inherently 
“therapeutic.”69 
Indeed, the equality framework sheds light on another area in 
which courts have drawn a distinction between “therapeutic” and 
“non-therapeutic” reproductive health care—namely, in the 
availability of condoms to prevent the spread of disease. As 
Professors Neil S. Siegel and Reva B. Siegel explain, the nineteenth- 
 
 68. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 
WASH. L. REV. 363, 365 & n.8 (1998); ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., FACT SHEET: UNINTENDED 
PREGNANCY IN THE U.S. (July 2015), available at https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-
Unintended-Pregnancy-US.html. 
 69. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion 
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 291–92 (1992) 
(discussing nineteenth-century views of pregnancy as natural and an inherent part of women’s 
destiny). 
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and early twentieth-century history of enforcing bans on 
contraception was a highly gendered one.
70
 Yet the gendered nature 
of the enforcement was also tied to the understanding of various 
forms of birth control as therapeutic or non-therapeutic. In the 
twentieth century, Connecticut and Massachusetts—states that 
outlawed contraception in most instances—made explicit exceptions 
for the use of condoms to prevent sexually transmitted diseases.
71
 
Thus, protection against disease, which was possible through a form 
of birth control used only by men, was a therapeutic purpose; 
avoidance of unwanted pregnancy, which could be achieved through 
forms of birth control available to women, was not. Indeed, even 
avoidance of dangerous pregnancies was not seen as medically 
necessary in the same way as avoidance of venereal disease; courts 
refused to read exceptions into the states’ birth control statutes even 
for women who would suffer substantial health risks from 
pregnancy.
72
 They, unlike men, were advised simply to abstain from 
sex.
73
 
This example from the early state regulation of birth control 
demonstrates how gender has played into traditional concepts of what 
is therapeutic and what is not. In the first half of the twentieth 
century, states like Massachusetts and Connecticut treated the use of 
a prophylactic, which does not even require a physician’s prescription 
or recommendation, as a medically necessary form of health care, 
whereas use of birth control pills to avoid pregnancy was not.
74
 As a 
consequence, women and men have different degrees of control over 
their reproductive lives. Men are able to avoid unwanted diseases and 
pregnancy, but unwanted pregnancy for women is not even conceived 
as medically cognizable harm. As Siegel and Siegel explain, this 
 
 70. Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Contraception as a Sex Equality Right, 124 YALE 
L.J. F. 349, 351–52 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/contraception-as-a-sex-
equality-right. 
 71. Id. at 352–53. 
 72. Id. at 352. 
 73. Id. at 352 & n.24. 
 74. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Corbett, 307 Mass. 7, 8 (1940)). Relatedly, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court delineated a distinction between contraception for the “‘general 
health’ of the patient,” and contraception to alleviate “a specific disease or condition,” although 
it ultimately held that both uses of contraception were forbidden. Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 
84, 86, 26 A.2d 582, 584 (1942) (citing State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856 (1940)). 
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“disparate treatment” both “reflected and reinforced traditional 
gender roles in sex and parenting.”75 
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that the equality 
framework also has the potential to undermine the view of 
reproductive health care as therapeutic. It is arguably the 
politicization of reproductive health care as an aspect of women’s 
equality that has led to the construction of abortion and contraception 
as political rather than personal and medical.
76
 If access to 
reproductive health care is intimately tied to women’s political, 
social, and economic equality, then reproductive health care itself is 
more easily framed as a political or ideological choice. As 
demonstrated above in Part II, the political construction of 
reproductive health care has persisted, shaping courts’ doctrinal 
approaches in First Amendment cases dealing with reproductive 
health care, both for better and for worse. The equality framework is 
also incomplete without the therapeutic health-care framework. 
CONCLUSION 
Though reproductive health care undoubtedly possesses moral and 
even spiritual dimensions that may differentiate it from some other 
forms of health care, the tendency to view reproductive health as 
inherently and primarily political has shaped the legal approach to 
contraception and abortion. Both recent and more venerable First 
Amendment cases arising in the reproductive health context reflect an 
underlying tension between framing reproductive health care as 
simply health care and framing it as primarily something else.  
In some cases, constructing reproductive health care as political 
has led to greater protection for speech related to abortion and 
contraception; in other instances, it has allowed legislatures to require 
doctors to promote ideological state messages and has prevented 
them from enforcing measures intended to protect pregnant women 
seeking access to unbiased information regarding their options. 
 
 75. Siegel & Siegel, supra note 70, at 355. 
 76. See generally Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: 
New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2052 (2011) (discussing the politicization 
of abortion in the 1970s and its association with the feminist movement). 
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Whether this understanding of reproductive health care is helpful or 
harmful in the First Amendment context, it is important to recognize 
that it often drives the legal analysis. Moreover, it is useful to 
recognize that these First Amendment cases, by validating the view 
of reproductive health care as non-medical, reinforce the distinction 
between therapeutic and non-therapeutic reproductive health care.  
If all reproductive health care were seen as therapeutic and 
necessary, several positive consequences would follow. First, it 
would mean that reproductive health care is taken seriously as a 
government interest and an individual need; it might weigh more 
heavily against companies’ claims to religious exemptions, for 
example. Second, it would be more difficult to engage in differential 
regulation of abortion and contraception if they were viewed as forms 
of medically necessary care. Broad conscience-based exemptions to 
provision of reproductive health care services would be harder to 
justify, as would so-called TRAP laws. Abortion and contraception 
could not be so easily isolated from other forms of health care, in 
statutory law or in constitutional doctrine. 
Ultimately, to arrive at this result, a new rhetorical framework is 
required—one that merges both equality and health. As demonstrated 
in Part III, the medical framework for reproductive health care is 
incomplete unless it builds upon an assumption that women are 
entitled to equality of opportunity and control over their futures. Yet, 
the equality framework, which sees access to abortion and 
contraception as essential to women’s political and social equality, is 
incomplete without an understanding of abortion and contraception as 
fundamentally private medical matters rather than political and 
ideological choices. 
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